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correlation between gCSI and CTRP data sets 
is significantly increased using GRAOC rather 
than AUC as a response metric (P = 1.3 × 
10-3, Student’s t-test; Supplementary Fig. 4). 
And third, efficacy as measured by GRmax 
and potency as measured by GR50 differ 
at a biological level, carry complementary 
information (low mutual information), and 
are associated with largely non-overlapping 
genetic alterations. In principle, variation 
in potency and efficacy can be captured by 
integrating across dose–response curves 
(GRAOC), but we find that information 
content is maximized if GR50 and GRmax are 
considered independently.
Because the ultimate purpose of 
antineoplastic drugs is to kill cancer cells13, 
and high potency is no guarantee of good 
efficacy, we propose that the best drugs 
and most important pharmacogenomic 
associations are not those associated with 
low IC50 values, but rather those that result 
in the most negative GR value at clinically 
relevant drug concentrations (e.g., 
Cmax). Relating in vitro measures of drug 
sensitivity to in vivo responses remains 
challenging17, but for this to have any 
chance of success it is essential that in vitro 
data are as informative and reproducible as 
possible.
Figure 2  Variation in efficacy and genomic enrichment based on GRmax values in the gCSI data set. 
(a) Distribution of GRmax and GR50 values for each drug across all cell lines. GR50 values are capped 
at 31 mM. (b) GR50 and GRmax enrichment by genomic alteration for each drug and tissue. Numbers 
represent significant (FDR < 0.15) associations for GRmax alone (red dots), GR50 alone (blue), or GRmax 
plus GR50 (purple). (c) Distribution of GRmax values for docetaxel in ovarian cancer lines based on BCL2 
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The illusion of control in germline-
engineering policy
To the Editor: 
The arrival and rapid adoption of the 
clustered, regularly interspaced, short 
palindromic repeats (CRISPR)–CRISPR-
associated protein 9 (Cas9) system1 has 
sparked ethical and societal controversy 
around genome editing of the human 
germline. Here, I point out the fallacy that 
such technologies and their applications 
can be globally prohibited on the basis of 
universal ethics and bans—the so-called 
‘illusion of control’. A look at previous 
technological developments suggests 
instead that differentiated and multi-faceted 
approaches that take into account the 
broadest range of possible ethical and social 
issues would be preferable for the oversight 
of CRISPR–Cas9 germline engineering. 
Such an approach would not only be more 
effective but also ensure that society has the 
greatest chance of capitalizing on potential 
opportunities of the technology.
To date, the CRISPR–Cas9 technique 
has been used to edit the genomes of (non-
viable) one-celled human embryos2,3. 
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international scientific consensus against 
reproductive cloning due to its low efficiency 
and the unacceptable potential health issues 
associated with cloned offspring—no binding 
global convention has been agreed upon. 
What’s more, the resulting non-binding 
United Nations (UN; New York) “Declaration 
on Human Cloning” remains ambiguous 
by calling to “prohibit all forms of human 
cloning inasmuch as they are incompatible 
with human dignity and the protection of 
human life”13.
The ambiguity in the UN declaration 
arises from its failure to define or interpret 
the forms of cloning that are incompatible 
with human dignity or what human life 
and human dignity should mean. The 
reason this ambiguity exists was because 
UN negotiations had to address the 
issue that dignity and life have different 
meanings in different cultures and religions 
globally14. In line with this, regulations 
vary in different countries or regions of 
the world, ranging from prohibition of all 
forms of cloning, to selectively permitting 
therapeutic cloning, to no official regulations 
at all (Table 1). Furthermore, the Council 
of Europe’s (Strasbourg, France) legally 
binding “Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine,” which prohibits in its protocol 
on cloning the creation of “a human being 
genetically identical to another human 
being, whether living or dead,” has not been 
signed or ratified by various member states, 
although it explicitly leaves the interpretation 
of “human being” to national policies to allow 
therapeutic cloning where it is accepted15. 
That (reproductive) cloning appears not 
to have been performed anywhere so far, 
including in countries where there is no 
legal ban, may encourage supporters of such 
international declarations or conventions. 
However, it can hardly provide evidence 
that they were instrumental in—or even 
contributed to—this outcome, especially 
given the huge technical hurdles that 
reproductive cloning faces16.
Illusion of (universal) control
The idea that biological technologies, like 
CRISPR–Cas9, or their applications can 
be (continuously) prohibited, and that 
this can be done globally thus appears to 
be reminiscent of the ‘illusion of control’ 
in psychology—a phenomenon in which 
people’s beliefs in the control are greater 
than can be actually justified. For instance, 
people act as if they have control in situations 
that are actually determined by chance17. 
Similarly, when people envision that they will 
obtain a certain result that they then achieve, 
published in the spring of 2015 prompted 
debate from within the field and by national 
academies about not only safety issues (such 
as off-target effects) but also ethical-moral 
questions. As a result, calls and statements 
have been released urging researchers to 
cease performing CRISPR–Cas9 experiments 
on human germ cells in a clinical context 
until safety issues have been resolved 
and the ethical and social implications of 
directed germline modifications broadly 
discussed among diverse societal groups 
and the public4–6. In February 2017 a report 
by the US National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine concluded 
that clinical trials might be permitted and 
outlined criteria for a strict regulatory 
framework. These include the restriction 
to preventing a serious disease, credible 
pre-clinical and/or clinical data on risks 
and potential health benefits, or long-term, 
multigenerational follow-up (that still 
respects personal autonomy)7. Furthermore, 
several groups have suggested the need to 
develop norms and harmonize regulations 
internationally or globally5,6.
Among the numerous ethical and social 
challenges of genome editing and its 
potential applications, a key unresolved 
issue relates to the notion that certain 
technologies or applications can be 
prohibited globally. The notion of banning 
technologies or applications worldwide has 
come to the fore as calls have grown for 
regulating germline editing in humans. The 
central assumption underlying this notion 
is that technologies can be prohibited—
continuously or until they are ‘safe 
enough’—and, moreover, that this can be 
done globally.
Considering reproductive technology as 
a whole, history provides several examples 
of procedures that prompted controversy 
due to ethical (including safety) or moral 
concerns once they became technically 
feasible. These include the use of assisted-
reproduction techniques (ARTs), such as in 
vitro fertilization (IVF), intracytoplasmic 
sperm injection (ICSI), and pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). As 
time has passed, these technologies have 
become more and more widely adopted and 
accepted across the globe. Today, they have 
come into use, even in countries where they 
were initially prohibited for considerable 
time periods (e.g., Costa Rica, which only 
effectively lifted its ban on IVF in 2016; and 
Germany, which only granted conditional 
permission for PGD in 2011).
In 2015, the United Kingdom approved 
therapeutic approaches that involve three-
parent mitochondrial genome replacement 
(MGR) in egg cells or one-cell embryos, 
which thus entail inheritable changes to 
the human germline. Furthermore, in the 
Ukraine, MGR has been applied to treat 
infertility, with a first baby girl reported to 
have been born early this year8. Similarly, 
US fertility researchers recently announced 
that they had conducted MGR in Mexico to 
prevent mitochondrial disease in a boy born 
last April9.
An expert panel recently convened by 
the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) concluded that clinical investigations 
of MGR are ethically permissible, though 
only under strict conditions, for example, 
if restricted solely to male embryos, which 
cannot pass on mitochondrial DNA to 
later generations10. Yet, by the time this 
article went to press, MGR therapy was 
still effectively banned in the United States 
owing to an FDA decision in 2001 (http://
bit.ly/2q2898X) because of concerns 
over safety issues such as negative effects 
from mitochondrial heteroplasmy and 
mitochondrial–nuclear mismatches. The 
decision was made in response to ART 
applied in several fertility clinics that 
involved the transfer of egg cytoplasm 
(including mitochondria)11. The decision 
indicates that the use in therapy of human 
cells “involving the transfer of genetic 
material by means other than the union of 
gamete nuclei” requires application to the 
FDA for permission.
Even the idea that technologies can 
be banned or prohibited until they are 
proven by research to be ‘safe enough’—at 
least in the context of reproduction and/
or therapies—appears to be disputable. 
What safe enough means may in practice 
be as much a question of perception 
involving different values and interests 
(and weighing perceived benefits against 
perceived risks) as it is one of available 
‘strictly scientific’ evidence or numbers 
(should they be available at all before first 
clinical applications). An example may be the 
decisions for the first ART via ICSI by four 
couples after 3–13 years of unsuccessful trials 
with traditional ART methods, even though 
only data from rabbits were available12.
An ambiguous state of global union
Imposing legal regulations that might 
prohibit the use of ART technology globally 
also appears non-feasible, at least when 
ethical or moral arguments stand in the 
way of new medical opportunities. Even 
with respect to human somatic cell nuclear 
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modification”23 (see also ref. 24). The bill 
may thus also affect the FDA’s capability to 
review MGR therapy approaches (see above).
When it comes to developing regulations 
on whether or under which conditions 
germline modifications should be permitted, 
entrenched moral stances and views on 
ethics will always be confronted by, and 
weighed against, the hopes and needs of 
affected people and their families and 
caregivers. These may include a desire 
for people to have their ‘own’ (genetically 
related) children not suffering the same 
disease (e.g., deafness or cystic fibrosis) as 
both parents do, or new fertility treatments 
that may be (felt to be) needed due to 
economic or cultural factors. Naturally, 
the result of the confrontation between 
societal ethics and individual hopes—be it 
a strict ban on all forms of human germline 
interventions or more differentiated 
they frequently overestimate their influence 
in bringing about the result18.
It is very unlikely that a global ban across 
jurisdictions is feasible. Indeed, current 
regulations related to germline interventions 
vary considerably across the globe19,20. They 
encompass bans—based on law or less-
enforceable governmental or research council 
guidelines—that prohibit both research and 
clinical or reproductive applications; or that 
prohibit clinical or reproductive application 
only; or that remain sufficiently unclear to 
raise doubts as to whether they cover human 
germline gene modification at all (Table 1).
In the United States, no federal law 
describes an outright ban on human germline 
interventions and work on human embryos, 
and in some states researchers could do 
research on embryos with private funding 
(as was the case with MGR experiments 
in Oregon in 2012; ref. 21). Yet, there are 
regulatory means in place that in fact prevent 
human germline modifications in publicly 
funded research and in clinical settings. Thus, 
the US National Institutes of Health does not 
fund “any use of gene-editing technologies 
in human embryos” and its Recombinant 
DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) will not 
entertain or review proposals for human 
germline alterations22. Furthermore, the FDA 
has regulatory authority over cell and gene 
therapy applying to any (not only publicly 
funded) research and clinical trials in the 
United States, and the agency has never 
approved a proposal to modify the germline.
In addition, a renewable provision (that 
has been extended twice into 2017) of the 
US Congress’s Fiscal Year 2016 omnibus 
spending bill prevents the FDA from using 
the budget to evaluate or permit trials with 
human embryos “intentionally created 
or modified to include a heritable genetic 
Table 1  Different supranational and national policies on cloning and germline modification
Cloning Germline modification




Declaration on Human 
Cloning
Ambiguous (calls for ban if incompatible with 
human dignity and the protection of human 
life)
Ambiguous (calls for ban on the applica-
tion of genetic engineering techniques 
that may be contrary to human dignity)
Non-binding declaration
European Convention 
on Human Rights & 
Biomedicine
Ambiguousa Banned Ambiguousa Banned Legally binding convention
National Brazil Banned Banned Banned Banned Law
China Permitted Banned Permitted Banned Guideline
Germany Banned Banned Banned Banned Law
India Permitted Banned Banned Banned Guideline
Japan Permitted Banned Ambiguous Banned Guideline
Mexico Permitted Banned Ambiguous Ambiguous Law
Russia Banned Banned No policy No policy Law
South Africa Permitted Banned Ambiguous Ambiguous Law
South Korea Permitted Banned Ambiguous Banned Guideline and law
Ukraine No Policy Banned ? ? Law
UK Permitted Banned Permitted Banned (but MGR 
permitted)
Law
USA No specific federal legislation (but individual 
states prohibit or permit different forms of 
cloning)
No outright ban by 
federal lawb
Permittedc in some 
states
No outright ban by 
federal lawb
Precludedd
State laws; federal laws/
regulations that address 
funding and FDA approval
aThe Convention’s protocol on cloning prohibits anyone “to create a human being genetically identical to another human being, whether living or dead.” But it 
explicitly “leaves the domestic laws of the States to define the scope of the term ‘human being’” (http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/
treaty/168). Furthermore, it demands that “an intervention seeking to modify the human genome may only be undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeu-
tic purposes and only if its aim is not to introduce any modification in the genome of any descendants” (Article 13); and that “where the law allows research on 
embryos in vitro, it shall ensure adequate protection of the embryo” (Article 18). bHowever, the FDA has regulatory authority over cloning technology and over cell 
and gene therapy. Furthermore, research using stem cells derived from human cloning and gene-editing technologies in human embryos are not eligible for gov-
ernment funding. cVarious states have passed laws that prohibit or permit different forms of cloning or embryo research, whereas some states have no policy or 
legislation on embryo research and human cloning30 (http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~neal/stemcell/Sup_Info.html). dThough there is no federal law that bans outright 
genetic modification of the germline, a provision of the Consolidated Appropriation Act (omnibus spending bill) of 2016 prevents FDA from using federal funds 
to evaluate and/or permit trials related to human embryos “intentionally created or modified to include a heritable genetic modification”23.
Ambiguous: indicates that it remains unclear from policy documents whether a practice is banned or may be permitted (e.g., if definitions of key terms are left 
open); banned: signifies that a practice is prohibited (explicitly or implicitly) by national law or guidelines; permitted: indicates that a practice is either allowed 
(but not regulated) by laws or guidelines or that it is allowed and regulated (e.g., requiring case-by-case licensing by authorities); no policy: denotes that a prac-
tice is not considered in policy documents; ?: unknown or unclear whether this practice is addressed by national policies.
Sources: National policy examples are based on original policy documents; the BioPolicyWiki of the Center for Genetics and Society (http://www.biopolicy-
wiki.org/); Supplementary Information to ‘World human cloning policies’ by Wheat and Matthews (http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~neal/stemcell/Sup_Info.html); the 
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questions, and thus improve policies over 
time—based on experiences (about hardly 
predictable interactions between society and 
technology) from different conditions and 
involving a wide variety of perspectives29. 
Such deliberation processes may reduce the 
danger of missing potentially important 
ethical, social or political implications, and 
further strengthen mutual trust.
‘Illusion-of-control’-like notions of 
universal ethics and bans on germline 
applications may thus favor one-dimensional 
thinking and illusionary policies, harboring 
the danger of leaving aside potentially more 
realistic and efficient policy alternatives. 
The latter type of ‘polycentric’ approach 
should be better capable of exploring the 
opportunities of genome-editing techniques, 
foster collaboration between countries and 
enhance the chances to grasp the broad 
range of possible ethical and social issues 
that would have to be taken into account by 
efficient and trust-building policies. They 
may also require governments, non-profits, 
investors and corporate managers to invest 
more effort to understand and experiment 
with conditions that both foster and ethically 
guide innovation.
Ensuring that these differentiated and 
polycentric policymaking strategies take 
into account the realities of ‘manyness’ (i.e., 
societal differences in values and interests 
across the globe) would mean tailoring 
regulations around specific conditions rather 
than rejecting applications of technologies 
as a whole. Such an approach to regulations 
would not only allow space for experimental 
efforts that generate important scientific 
data (e.g., on safety issues), but also reduce 
incentives for researchers to move to 
countries with more lax standards or less 
stringent oversight. At the same time as they 
allow research to progress, they would also 
allow meaningful democratic deliberation 
processes on futures with genome-editing 
applications that people may, or may not, 
want.
Harald König
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Institute for 
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